Person: Rasmusen, Eric Bennett
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Rasmusen
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Eric Bennett
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Rasmusen, Eric Bennett
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Publication Lowering the Bar to Raise the Bar: Licensing Difficulty and Attorney Quality in Japan(Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, 2013) Ramseyer, John; Rasmusen, Eric BennettUnder certain circumstance, a relaxation in occupational licensing standards can increase the quality of those who enter the industry. The effect turns on the opportunity costs of preparing for the licensing examination: making the test easier can increase the quality of those passing if it lowers the opportunity costs enough to increase the number of those willing to go to the trouble of taking the test. We explore the theoretical circumstances under which this can occur and the actual effect of the relaxation of the difficulty of the bar exam in Japan from 1992 to 2011.Publication Lowering the Bar to Raise the Bar: Licensing Difficulty and Attorney Quality in Japan(Society for Japanese Studies, 2015) Ramseyer, John; Rasmusen, Eric BennettUnder certain circumstance, a relaxation in occupational licensing standards can increase the quality of those who enter the industry. The effect turns on the opportunity costs of preparing for the licensing examination: making the test easier can increase the quality of those passing if it lowers the opportunity costs enough to increase the number of those willing to go to the trouble of taking the test. We explore the theoretical circumstances under which this can occur and the actual effect of the relaxation of the difficulty of the bar exam in Japan from 1992 to 2011.Publication Exclusive Dealing: Before, Bork, and Beyond(University of Chicago Press, 2014) Ramseyer, John; Rasmusen, Eric BennettAntitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that Bork articulated in The Antitrust Paradox. Indeed, they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency. Yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain how exclusive dealing could possibly cause harm, and have modelled a variety of special cases where it does. Some (albeit not all) of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges.