Publication: Exclusive Dealing: Before, Bork, and Beyond
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Date
2014
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University of Chicago Press
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J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Exclusive Dealing: Before, Bork, and Beyond, 57 J. L. & Econ. S145 (2014).
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Abstract
Antitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that Bork articulated in The Antitrust Paradox. Indeed, they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency. Yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain how exclusive dealing could possibly cause harm, and have modelled a variety of special cases where it does. Some (albeit not all) of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges.
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