Person:

Moran, Richard

Discusses the rationalizing view of psychological discourse and the requirements of common sense psychology, specifically that of accommodating both first- and third-person ascriptions of mental states. Intentional psychology as a theory; Self-ascription and univocality; Interpretation theory and the first person; Saving the asymmetries; Rationality and the two perspectives of intentional psychology.

In this article, I respond to the comments of six philosophers on my book Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. My reply to Joseph Corbi mostly concerns the relation between the two modes of self-knowledge I call 'avowal' and 'attribution,' and the sense of activity involved in self-knowledge; in responding to Joseph Prades I try to clarify my picture of deliberation and show that it is not 'intellectualist' in an objectionable sense; Komarine Romdenh-Romluc's paper enables me to say some things about the idea of unconscious beliefs, specifically in relation to the phenomenological tradition; the paper by Hilan Bensusan and Manuel de Pinedo helps me to clarify my sense of the relation of the first person perspective to the specifically normative relation to one's believes and other attitudes; and Carla Bagnoli's paper provides an opportunity to explore some connections between the deliberative stance and the notion of recognition in Hegel and in contemporary philosophy.