Publication: Interpretation Theory and the First Person
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Date
1994
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Blackwell Publishing
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Moran, Richard. 1994. Interpretation theory and the first person. Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 175: 154-173.
Abstract
Discusses the rationalizing view of psychological discourse and the requirements of common sense psychology, specifically that of accommodating both first- and third-person ascriptions of mental states. Intentional psychology as a theory; Self-ascription and univocality; Interpretation theory and the first person; Saving the asymmetries; Rationality and the two perspectives of intentional psychology.
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