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Richard, Mark

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Richard

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Richard, Mark

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Now showing 1 - 6 of 6
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    What are Propositions?
    (Taylor & Francis, 2013) Richard, Mark
    This paper defends the view that propositions – that is, what are picked about by complement clauses and the range of quantifiers like that in ‘Sanna believes all that Matti said' – are states of affairs. States of affairs – and thus propositions – are not, in the primary sense, representational; what is representational and what is true or false in the first instance are mental states and sentence tokens that represent propositions. There is, it is argued, a derivative sense in which propositions are bearers of truth, but truth in that sense is a derivative, non-explanatory notion. This view is contrasted with views like the one Scott Soames develops in What is Meaning?. It's argued that this view is superior to Soames' in various ways.
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    Reply to Lynch, Miščević, and Stojanović
    (KruZak, 2011) Richard, Mark
    This paper responds to discussions of my book When Truth Gives Out by Michael Lynch, Nenad Miščević, and Isidora Stojanović. Among the topics discussed are: whether relativism is incoherent (because it requires one to think that certain of one’s views are and are not epistemically superior to views one denies); whether and when sentences in which one slurs an individual or group are truth valued; whether relativism about matters of taste gives an account of “faultless disagreement” superior to certain “absolutist” accounts of the matter.
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    Review of Being For by Mark Schroeder
    (Duke University Press, 2011) Richard, Mark
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    Relativistic content and disagreement
    (Springer Nature, 2011) Richard, Mark
    Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne’s Relativism and Monadic Truth presses a number of worries about relativistic content.1 It forces one to think carefully about what a relativist should mean by saying that speakers disagree or contradict one another in asserting such content. My focus is on this question, though at points (in particular in Section 4) I touch on other issues Cappelen and Hawthorne (CH) raise.2
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    Reply to MacFarlane, Scharp, Shapiro, and Wright
    (Springer Verlag, 2012) Richard, Mark
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    Precis of When Truth Gives Out
    (Springer Verlag, 2012) Richard, Mark