Person: Strzalecki, Tomasz
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Strzalecki
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Tomasz
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Strzalecki, Tomasz
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Publication Efficient Allocations under Ambiguity(Elsevier, 2011) Strzalecki, Tomasz; Werner, JanImportant implications of the expected utility hypothesis and risk aversion are that if agents have the same probability belief, then consumption plans in every efficient allocation of resources under uncertainty are comonotone with the aggregate endowment, and if their beliefs are concordant, then the consumption plans are measurable with respect to the aggregate endowment. We study these two properties of efficient allocations for models of preferences that exhibit ambiguity aversion using the concept of conditional beliefs, which we introduce in this paper. We provide characterizations of such conditional beliefs for the standard models of preferences used in applications.Publication Probabilistic Sophistication and Variational Preferences(Elsevier, 2011) Strzalecki, TomaszThis paper shows that in the class of variational preferences the notion of probabilistic sophistication is equivalent to expected utility as long as there exists at least one event such that the independence axiom holds for bets on that event. This extends the result of Marinacci (2002) and provides a novel interpretation of his result.Publication Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Recursive Models of Ambiguity Aversion(Econometric Society, 2013) Strzalecki, TomaszDynamic models of ambiguity aversion are increasingly popular in applied work. This paper shows that there is a strong interdependence in such models between the ambiguity attitude and the preference for the timing of the resolution of uncertainty, as defined by the classic work of Kreps and Porteus (1978). The modeling choices made in the domain of ambiguity aversion influence the set of modeling choices available in the domain of timing attitudes. The main result is that the only model of ambiguity aversion that exhibits indifference to timing is the maxmin expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). This paper examines the structure of the timing nonindifference implied by the other commonly used models of ambiguity aversion. This paper also characterizes the indifference to long-run risk, a notion introduced by Duffie and Epstein (1992). The interdependence of ambiguity and timing that this paper identifies is of interest both conceptually and practically—especially for economists using these models in applications.Publication How Much Would You Pay to Resolve Long-Run Risk?(American Economic Association, 2014) Epstein, Larry G.; Farhi, Emmanuel; Strzalecki, TomaszThough risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution have been the subjects of careful scrutiny, the long-run risks literature as well as the broader literature using recursive utility to address asset pricing puzzles have ignored the full implications of their parameter specifications. Recursive utility implies that the temporal resolution of risk matters and a quantitative assessment thereof should be part of the calibration process. This paper gives a sense of the magnitudes of implied timing premia. Its objective is to inject temporal resolution of risk into the discussion of the quantitative properties of long-run risks and related models.Publication Axiomatization and Measurement of Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting(Oxford University Press (OUP), 2014) Montiel Olea, J. L.; Strzalecki, TomaszThis article provides an axiomatic characterization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and a more general class of semi-hyperbolic preferences. We impose consistency restrictions directly on the intertemporal trade-offs by relying on what we call “annuity compensations.” Our axiomatization leads naturally to an experimental design that disentangles discounting from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In a pilot experiment we use the partial identification approach to estimate bounds for the distributions of discount factors in the subject pool. Consistent with previous studies, we find evidence for both present and future bias.Publication Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility(The Econometric Society, 2015) Fudenberg, Drew; Iijima, Ryota; Strzalecki, TomaszPerturbed utility functions—the sum of expected utility and a nonlinear perturbation function—provide a simple and tractable way to model various sorts of stochastic choice. We provide two easily understood conditions each of which characterizes this representation: One condition generalizes the acyclicity condition used in revealed preference theory, and the other generalizes Luce’s IIA condition. We relate the discrimination or selectivity of choice rules to properties of their associated perturbations, both across different agents and across decision problems. We also show that these representations correspond to a form of ambiguity-averse preferences for an agent who is uncertain about her true utility.Publication Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences(The Econometric Society, 2011) Strzalecki, TomaszThis paper axiomatizes the robust control criterion of multiplier preferences introduced by Hansen and Sargent (2001). The axiomatization relates multiplier preferences to other classes of preferences studied in decision theory, in particular, the variational preferences recently introduced by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006a). This paper also establishes a link between the parameters of the multiplier criterion and the observable behavior of the agent. This link enables measurement of the parameter on the basis of observable choice data and provides a useful tool for applications.Publication Collective Action, Heterogeneous Loyalties and Path Dependence: Micro-evidence from Senegal(Oxford University Press, 2004) Platteau, Jean-Philippe; Strzalecki, TomaszIn Senegal, we encountered a situation in which a minority group of migrant fishermen had completely different sets of expectations regarding a collective action depending on the location where they operated. In one village expectations were pessimistic, while in the other village they were optimistic. Understanding this contrast and its implications provides the main justification for the paper. To be able to account for the contrast between the two areas, pessimistic expectations in the first area have to be traced back to a preceding conflict that could never be settled satisfactorily. A perverse path-dependent process had thus been set in motion that could not be changed by a simple act of will of a determined leadership. To demonstrate the links between expectations and actions that fit with the story told, we propose a simple model of collective action with asymmetric information.Publication Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion(The Econometric Society, 2015) Fudenberg, Drew; Strzalecki, TomaszWe characterize a generalization of discounted logistic choice that incorporates a parameter to capture different views the agent might have about the costs and benefits of larger choice sets. The discounted logit model used in the empirical literature is the special case that displays a “preference for flexibility” in the sense that the agent always prefers to add additional items to a menu. Other cases display varying levels of “choice aversion,” where the agent prefers to remove items from a menu if their ex ante value is below a threshold. We show that higher choice aversion, as measured by dislike of bigger menus, also corresponds to an increased preference for putting off decisions as late as possible.Publication Depth of Reasoning and Higher Order Beliefs(Elsevier BV, 2014) Strzalecki, TomaszAs demonstrated by the email game of Rubinstein (1989), the predictions of the standard equilibrium models of game theory are sensitive to assumptions about the fine details of the higher order beliefs. This paper shows that models of bounded depth of reasoning based on level-k thinking or cognitive hierarchy make predictions that are independent of the tail assumptions on the higher order beliefs. The framework developed here provides a language that makes it possible to identify general conditions on depth of reasoning, instead of committing to a particular model such as level-k thinking or cognitive hierarchy.