Publication: Efficient Allocations under Ambiguity
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Date
2011
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Elsevier
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Strzalecki, Tomasz, and Jan Werner. 2011. “Efficient allocations under ambiguity.” Journal of Economic Theory 146 (3) (May): 1173-1194.
Abstract
Important implications of the expected utility hypothesis and risk aversion are that if agents have the same probability belief, then consumption plans in every efficient allocation of resources under uncertainty are comonotone with the aggregate endowment, and if their beliefs are concordant, then the consumption plans are measurable with respect to the aggregate endowment. We study these two properties of efficient allocations for models of preferences that exhibit ambiguity aversion using the concept of conditional beliefs, which we introduce in this paper. We provide characterizations of such conditional beliefs for the standard models of preferences used in applications.
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Keywords
common prior, risk sharing, ambiguity aversion, general equilibrium
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