Publication:

Efficient Allocations under Ambiguity

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Date

2011

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Elsevier
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you.

Research Projects

Organizational Units

Journal Issue

Citation

Strzalecki, Tomasz, and Jan Werner. 2011. “Efficient allocations under ambiguity.” Journal of Economic Theory 146 (3) (May): 1173-1194.

Abstract

Important implications of the expected utility hypothesis and risk aversion are that if agents have the same probability belief, then consumption plans in every efficient allocation of resources under uncertainty are comonotone with the aggregate endowment, and if their beliefs are concordant, then the consumption plans are measurable with respect to the aggregate endowment. We study these two properties of efficient allocations for models of preferences that exhibit ambiguity aversion using the concept of conditional beliefs, which we introduce in this paper. We provide characterizations of such conditional beliefs for the standard models of preferences used in applications.

Description

Other Available Sources

Research Data

Keywords

common prior, risk sharing, ambiguity aversion, general equilibrium

Terms of Use

This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles (OAP), as set forth at Terms of Service

Endorsement

Review

Supplemented By

Related Stories