Publication: Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion
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2019-09
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Center for International Development at Harvard University
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Besley, Timothy, Anders Jensen, and Torsten Persson. “Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion.” CID Working Paper Series 2019.372, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, September 2019.
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Abstract
This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and is the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the UK, which led to widespread evasion. The evidence is consistent with the model’s main predictions on the dynamics of evasion.
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