Harvard Kennedy School

We show that world trade network datasets contain empirical evidence that the dynamics of innovation in the world economy follows indeed the concept of creative destruction, as proposed by J.A. Schumpeter more than half a century ago. National economies can be viewed as complex, evolving systems, driven by a stream of appearance and disappearance of goods and services. Products appear in bursts of creative cascades. We find that products systematically tend to co-appear, and that product appearances lead to massive disappearance events of existing products in the following years. The opposite – disappearances followed by periods of appearances – is not observed. This is an empirical validation of the dominance of cascading competitive replacement events on the scale of national economies, i.e. creative destruction. We find a tendency that more complex products drive out less complex ones, i.e. progress has a direction. Finally we show that the growth trajectory of a country’s product output diversity can be understood by a recently proposed evolutionary model of Schumpeterian economic dynamics.

In this paper we document that the probability that a product is added to a country’s export basket is, on average, 65% larger if a neighboring country is a successful exporter of that same product. We interpret our result as evidence of international intra-industry knowledge diffusion. Our results are consistent with the overall consensus in the literature on technology spillovers: diffusion is stronger at shorter distances; is weaker for more knowledge-intensive products; and has become faster over time.

In economic systems, the mix of products that countries make or export has been shown to be a strong leading indicator of economic growth. Hence, methods to characterize and predict the structure of the network connecting countries to the products that they export are relevant for understanding the dynamics of economic development. Here we study the presence and absence of industries in international and domestic economies and show that these networks are significantly nested. This means that the less filled rows and columns of these networks' adjacency matrices tend to be subsets of the fuller rows and columns. Moreover, we show that their nestedness remains constant over time and that it is sustained by both, a bias for industries that deviate from the networks' nestedness to disappear, and a bias for the industries that are missing according to nestedness to appear. This makes the appearance and disappearance of individual industries in each location predictable. We interpret the high level of nestedness observed in these networks in the context of the neutral model of development introduced by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009). We show that the model can reproduce the high level of nestedness observed in these networks only when we assume a high level of heterogeneity in the distribution of capabilities available in countries and required by products. In the context of the neutral model, this implies that the high level of nestedness observed in these economic networks emerges as a combination of both, the complementarity of inputs and heterogeneity in the number of capabilities available in countries and required by products. The stability of nestedness in industrial ecosystems, and the predictability implied by it, demonstrates the importance of the study of network properties in the evolution of economic networks.

The total amount of development finance generated by Vietnam has been exceptionally high from all significant sources using all standard measures of comparison. However, there are many potential unintended consequences of Vietnam’s successful resource mobilization, with significant implications for the future financing of development. There are several steps the government can take to mitigate these risks. The principal vulnerabilities created by Vietnam’s mobilization of substantial resources for development finance fall into two main categories: threats to macroeconomic stability caused by imbalances in the composition of funding; and risks for microeconomic management arising from imprudent financing structures. The most serious macroeconomic threats are: public sector funds crowding out both access to and utilization of private sector funds; overleveraging of insufficient equity for unsustainable levels of debt; financial exclusion of low-income households and family enterprises; and flight of hot capital. The most serious microeconomic risks are: maturity risk from over-reliance on short-term financing for long-term investments; foreign exchange risk from over-use of foreign capital for investments in non-tradable goods; credit risk from debt-financed speculation in asset bubbles; and fiscal gap risk from public sector dependence on unsustainable revenue sources. The suggested ways of mitigating these vulnerabilities include: further deregulation and liberalization of the banking sector, coupled with government disengagement from commercial financing; further development of equity markets and more rigorous enforcement of prudential norms; further development of microfinance institutions, products, and delivery systems; introduction of market-based instruments to manage FPI speculative outflows, together with more effective monitoring of the private sector’s external debt; further development of domestic long-term debt instruments; better coordination of monetary and fiscal policy; and continued implementation of comprehensive tax reform.

Two decades ago, many people had drawn a lesson from the 1980s: Japan's variant of capitalism was the best model. Other countries around the world should and would follow it. Japan's admired institutions included relationship banking, keiretsu, bonus compensation for workers, lifetime employment, consensus building, strategic trade policy, administrative guidance, pro-saving policies, and corporate goals of maximizing companies’ industrial capacity or market share. These features were viewed as elements of Japanese economic success that were potentially worthy of emulation. The Japanese model quickly lost its luster in the 1990s, however, when the stock market and real estate market crashed, followed by many years of severe stagnation in the real economy.

A decade ago, many thought that the lesson of the 1990s had been that the United States’ variant of capitalism was the best model, and that other countries should and would follow. The touted institutions included arms-length banking, competition for corporate control, Anglo-American securities markets, reliance on accounting firms and rating agencies, derivatives, bonus-compensation for executives, an adversarial legal system, deregulation, pro-consumer credit policies, and corporate goals of maximizing companies’ profits or share price. These features were viewed as elements of US economic success and potentially worthy of emulation. The American model quickly lost its attractiveness in the 2000s, however, when the stock market and real estate market crashed. Poor economic performance left per capita income and median household income below their levels of 2000 – even before the severe US-originated recession of 2008–2009.2 "Where should countries look now, for models of economic success to emulate?"

Perhaps they should look to the periphery of the world economy. Some smaller and less-rich countries have experimented with policies and institutions that could usefully be adopted by others. Singapore achieved rich country status with a unique development strategy. Among its many innovations was a paternalistic approach to saving. Costa Rica in Central America and Mauritius in Africa are each conspicuous performance standouts in their respective regions. Among many other decisions that worked out well, both countries have foregone a standing army. The result in both cases has been histories with no coups and with financial savings that could be used for education and other good things. Slovakia and Estonia in Central/Eastern Europe have simplified their tax systems by means of a flat tax.

Some of the lessons from emerging market countries can be useful for the big advanced countries. Two illustrations from microeconomics: First, Singapore pioneered the use of the price mechanism to reduce traffic congestion in its urban center. London emulated Singapore when it successfully adopted congestion pricing in 2003; other big cities should do the same. Second, Mexico pioneered Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT). CCT programs, which make poverty benefits contingent on children's school attendance, have been emulated in many countries, and embraced even in New York City.

Some emerging market and developing countries also have lessons for the United States in areas of macroeconomics, specifically regarding the cyclicality of fiscal policy. To state the message of this paper most succinctly, over the last decade countries from Chile to China learned how to run properly countercyclical fiscal policy: taking advantage of boom periods such as 2003–2008 to achieve high national savings, and in particular to run budget surpluses, which then allows some fiscal ease in response to downturns such as 2008–2009. During this same period, advanced countries such as the United States and United Kingdom forgot how to run countercyclical fiscal policy. Perhaps the ‘leaders’ could look to the ‘followers’ for some tips on how to get back on track.

The paper studies forecasts of real growth rates and budget balances made by official government agencies among 33 countries. In general, the forecasts are found: (i) to have a positive average bias, (ii) to be more biased in booms, and (iii) to be even more biased at the 3-year horizon than at shorter horizons. This over-optimism in official forecasts can help explain excessive budget deficits, especially the failure to run surpluses during periods of high output: if a boom is forecasted to last indefinitely, retrenchment is treated as unnecessary. Many believe that better fiscal policy can be obtained by means of rules such as ceilings for the deficit or, better yet, the structural deficit. But we also find: (iv) countries subject to a budget rule, in the form of euroland’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), make official forecasts of growth and budget deficits that are even more biased and more correlated with booms than do other countries. This effect may help explain frequent violations of the SGP. The question becomes how to overcome governments’ tendency to satisfy fiscal targets by wishful thinking rather than by action. Chile in 2000 created structural budget institutions that may have solved the problem. Independent expert panels, insulated from political pressures, are responsible for estimating the long-run trends that determine whether a given deficit is deemed structural or cyclical. The result is that Chile’s official forecasts of growth and the budget have not been overly optimistic, even in booms. Unlike many countries in the North, Chile took advantage of the 2002–7 expansion to run budget surpluses, and so was able to ease in the 2008–9 recession.

In the past, industrial countries have tended to pursue countercyclical or, at worst, acyclical fiscal policy. In sharp contrast, emerging and developing countries have followed procyclical fiscal policy, thus exacerbating the underlying business cycle. We show that, over the last decade, about a third of the developing world has been able to escape the procyclicality trap and actually become countercyclical. In line with existing literature, we confirm the role of increased financial integration and lower output volatility in reducing overall procyclicality. In this paper, however, we focus on the role played by the quality of institutions. Indeed, the quality of institutions seems to be a key determinant of a country's ability to graduate. We provide a formal analysis, controlling for the endogeneity of institutions and other determinants of fiscal procyclicality, that strongly suggests that there is a causal link running from stronger institutions to less procyclical or more countercyclical fiscal policy.

In the past, various great powers have taken the stage as models of economic and social development. Examples such as Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States have had their time in the spotlight that has come and gone as flaws were exposed; and other countries have learned what they did well and what they did poorly. The great powers are not the only models, however. Much can be learned from small countries which are often free to experiment with new institutions and new policies. This paper describes lessons that can be learned from such countries though no one size fits all.

Countries with oil, mineral or other natural resource wealth, on average, have failed to show better economic performance than those without, often because of undesirable side effects. This is the phenomenon known as the Natural Resource Curse. This paper reviews the literature, classified according to six channels of causation that have been proposed. The possible channels are: (i) long-term trends in world prices, (ii) price volatility, (iii) permanent crowding out of manufacturing, (iv) autocratic/oligarchic institutions, (v) anarchic institutions, and (vi) cyclical Dutch Disease. With the exception of the first channel – the long-term trend in commodity prices does not appear to be downward – each of the other channels is an important part of the phenomenon. Skeptics have questioned the Natural Resource Curse, pointing to examples of commodity-exporting countries that have done well and arguing that resource exports and booms are not exogenous. The relevant policy question for a country with natural resources is how to make the best of them.

Development economists should stop acting as categorical advocates (or detractors) for specific approaches to development. They should instead be diagnosticians, helping decisionmakers choose the right model (and remedy) for their specific realities, among many contending models (and remedies). In this spirit, Ricardo Hausmann, Andres Velasco, and I have developed a "growth diagnostics" framework that sketches a systematic process for identifying binding constraints and prioritizing policy reforms in multilateral agencies and bilateral donors. Growth diagnostics is based on the idea that not all constraints bind equally and that a sensible and practical strategy consists of identifying the most serious constraint(s) at work. The practitioner works with a decision tree to do this. The second step in growth diagnostics is to identify remedies for relaxing the constraint that are appropriate to the context and take cognizance of potential second-best complications. Successful countries are those that have implemented these two steps in an ongoing manner: identify sequentially the most binding constraints and remove them with locally suited remedies. Diagnostics requires pragmatism and eclecticism, in the use of both theory and evidence. It has no room for dogmatism, imported blueprints, or empirical purism.