Bolivia's Economic Pivot: The Making of a Macroeconomic Crisis

Abstract

Bolivia’s macroeconomic crisis was long in the making. A temporary commodity windfall and a gas export engine built in the 1990s delivered a decade of growth, rising fiscal revenues, and an unprecedented buildup of foreign assets. But instead of using that window to build new sources of tradable income and productive capacity, the country adopted policies that gradually weakened the very gas sector on which the model depended. As gas production and hydrocarbon revenues fell, the state chose to preserve spending and the fixed exchange rate. The result was a sequence of increasingly costly stopgaps: first the depletion of international reserves, then the collapse of the peg, the rise of the inflation tax, and financial repression. In the process, households saw the real value of their savings eroded through the pension system and bank deposits. This paper shows how that strategy delayed adjustment for nearly a decade while making the eventual crisis more severe. Using counterfactual benchmarks for output and the real exchange rate, it quantifies the cost of delay and the scale of the distortions that any stabilization program must now unwind.