Publication: Games of Threats
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Date
2018-03
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Published Version
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Elsevier BV
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Citation
Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "Games of Threats." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 139–145.
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Abstract
A game of threats on a finite set of players, N, is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S ⊆ N, such that d(S) = -d(N\S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition d(Ø) = 0. We show that analogs of the classic Shapley axioms for coalitional games determine a unique value for games of threats. This value assigns to each player an average of the threat powers, d(S), of the coalitions that include the player. Games of threats arise naturally in value theory for strategic games and may have applications in other branches of game theory.
Description
Citation: Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "Games of Threats." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 139–145.
Keywords from HBS librarians: Game Theory; Mathematical Methods;
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Keywords
Economics and Econometrics, Finance
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