Publication: The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games
Loading...
Open/View Files
Date
2007
Authors
Published Version
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Elsevier
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you.
Citation
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2007. The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games. Journal of Economic Theory 132, no. 1: 461-473.
Abstract
We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to the n-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these “third parties” to effectively enforce contracts.
Description
Other Available Sources
Research Data
Keywords
repeated games, communication, private monitoring, folk theorem
Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material (LAA), as set forth at Terms of Service