Publication: Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games
Open/View Files
Date
1997
Authors
Published Version
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
MIT Press
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you.
Citation
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 1997. Measuring players' losses in experimental games. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 2: 507-536.
Research Data
Abstract
In some experiments rational players who understand the structure of the game could improve their payoff. We bound the size of the observed losses in several such experiments. To do this, we suppose that observed play resembles an equilibrium because players learn about their opponents' play. Consequently, in an extensive-form game, some actions that are not optimal given the true distribution of opponents' play could be optimal given available information. We find that average losses are small: $0.03 to $0.64 per player with stakes between $2 and $30. In one of the three experiments we examine, this also implies a narrow range of outcome.
Description
Other Available Sources
Keywords
Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material (LAA), as set forth at Terms of Service