Publication: Learning to Play Bayesian Games
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Date
2004
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Elsevier
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Dekel, Eddie, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine. 2004. Learning to play Bayesian games. Games and Economic Behavior 46, no. 2: 282-303.
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Abstract
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of games with a move by Nature. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as well as learning about the opponents' strategies. A second goal is to argue that quite restrictive assumptions are necessary to justify the concept of Nash equilibrium without a common prior as a steady state of a learning process.
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