Publication: Competing Auctions
Open/View Files
Date
2004
Published Version
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
MIT Press
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you.
Citation
Ellison, Glen, Drew Fudenberg and Markus M. Mobius. 2004. Competing auctions. Journal of the European Economic Association 2(1): 30-66.
Research Data
Abstract
This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer—seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin.
Description
Other Available Sources
Keywords
Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material (LAA), as set forth at Terms of Service