Publication: Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction
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Date
2002
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Elsevier
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Citation
Dekel, Eddie, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine. 2002. Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction. Journal of Economic Theory 104, no. 2: 473-478.
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Abstract
In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses “trembles” to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, <i>J. Econ. Theory</i> 89, 165–185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended.
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Keywords
self-confirming equilibrium, rationalizability, subjective uncertainty, behavior strategies, extensive-form games
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