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Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors

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2011

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10.2139/ssrn.1014157

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Elsevier
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Li, Feng, and Suraj Srinivasan. "Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors." Journal of Financial Economics 102, no. 2 (November 2011): 454–469.

Abstract

We examine CEO compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms where founders serve as a director with a non-founder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay for performance sensitivity for non-founder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average U.S. board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms.

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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1663905

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corporate governance, executive compensation, retention, policy, motivation and incentives, performance, governing and advisory boards, mergers and acquisitions, wages

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This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles (OAP), as set forth at Terms of Service

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http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:29660922

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