Publication: Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium
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Date
2014
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Published Version
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National Academy of Sciences
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Citation
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2014. "Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111 (3): 10826-10829.
Abstract
We examine the long-term implication of two models of learning with recency bias: recursive weights and limited memory. We show that both models generate similar beliefs and that both have a weighted universal consistency property. Using the limited-memory model we produce learning procedures that both are weighted universally consistent and converge with probability one to strict Nash equilibrium.
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Keywords
Evolution, Learning, Recency, Fictitious Play, Game Theory, Universal Consistency
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