No Place for Nostalgia in Science: A Response to Arkes and Tetlock

Abstract

Comments on an article by Arkes and Tetlock (see record 2005-02255-001). In this response to Arkes and Tetlock's critique, we raise three issues. First, we challenge the notion of attitude and prejudice as constructs that operate only in conscious form. Second, we show that it is not possible to set aside the concept of implicit prejudice by suggesting that it reflects mere association-unless Arkes and Tetlock wish to admit that mere associations produce convergent validity with measures of prejudice as well as rapidly emerging data on criterion validity. Finally, in the work of others, the notion of prejudice as antipathy has been broadly challenged, and Arkes and Tetlock questions have the benefit of alerting scholars to the ongoing redefinition of the concept. Throughout the critique, Arkes and Tetlock's arguments rely on earlier modes of thinking about attitude and prejudice. This is evinced in their difficulty with the modern notion that conscious prejudice is but one form of prejudice, in ignoring evidence about implicit attitude validity by referring to the concept as reflecting "mere association," in setting aside the work of social scientists more broadly who have argued that prejudice need not involve antipathy and by confusing reasonableness with rationality.