Publication: Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
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2012-08
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American Economic Association
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Kessler, Judd B. and Alvin E. Roth. Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate. American Economic Review 102, no. 5 (2012): 2018-2047.
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Abstract
Organ donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor, and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.
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