Publication: Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
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Date
2015
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Published Version
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The Econometric Society
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Fudenberg, Drew, and Yuichiro Kamada. 2015. Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium. Theoretical Economics 10, no. 3: 775–806. Portico. doi:10.3982/te1362.
Abstract
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady-state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.
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Keywords
rationalizability, common knowledge, extensive-form games, self-confirming equilibrium
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