Publication: How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Loading...
Open/View Files
Date
2013
Authors
Published Version
Published Version
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Elsevier
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you.
Citation
Cohen, Alma, and Charles C.Y. Wang. "How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment." Journal of Financial Economics 110, no. 3 (December 2013): 627–641.
Abstract
The well-established negative correlation between staggered boards (SBs) and firm value could be due to SBs leading to lower value or a reflection of low-value firms' greater propensity to maintain SBs. We analyze the causal question using a natural experiment involving two Delaware court rulings―separated by several weeks and going in opposite directions―that affected the antitakeover force of SBs. We contribute to the long-standing debate on staggered boards by documenting empirical evidence consistent with the market viewing SBs as leading to lower firm value for the affected firms.
Description
Other Available Sources
Research Data
Keywords
governing and advisory boards
Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles (OAP), as set forth at Terms of Service