Publication: Reexamining staggered boards and shareholder value
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Date
2017
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Elsevier BV
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Citation
Cohen, Alma, and Charles C.Y. Wang. 2017. “Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value.” Journal of Financial Economics (June). doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.004.
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Abstract
Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.
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Keywords
governing and advisory boards, corporate governance, value
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