Adaptive Representation in the U.S. Congress

Abstract

Canonical theories of representation emphasize that electoral incentives drive legislator behavior, yet empirical research, focusing primarily on member ideology, finds little evidence of member adaptation to electoral threat. We compile an expansive dataset measuring both district- and chamber-oriented activities, including new measures of member travel and geographically-targeted legislation. Using a within-member design, we find electorally threatened representatives spend more time in their districts, use more local phrases on the floor, secure more appropriations for constituents, serve on more constituency-oriented committees (and fewer policy-related committees), and sponsor fewer national policy-focused bills and amendments. Threatened members adapt by shifting focus from partisan policy work toward less-ideological constituent service, even as their voting records remain mostly stable. We argue electoral competition operates as a moderating force not by changing legislators' ideological positions but by reshaping how they budget time between competing representational activities.