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Incomplete Contingent Labor Contract, Asymmetric Residual Rights and Authority, and the Theory of the Firm

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2000-05

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Center for International Development at Harvard University
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Yang, Xiaokai. “Incomplete Contingent Labor Contract, Asymmetric Residual Rights and Authority, and the Theory of the Firm.” CID Working Paper Series 2000.45, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, May 2000.

Abstract

In the paper the trade-offs among endogenous transaction costs caused by two-sided moral hazard, exogenous monitoring cost, and economies of specialization are specified in a Grossman, Hart and Moore (GHM) model to absorb Maskin and Tirole's recent critique and Holmstrom and Milgrom's criticism of the model of incomplete contract. The extended GHM model allowing incomplete contingent labor contract as well complete contingent contract of goods trade is used to explore the implications of structure of ownership and residual rights for the equilibrium network size of division of implications of structure of ownership and residual rights for the equilibrium network size of division of labor and productivity.

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http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:39533225

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