HKS Ash Center

This report draws on the 2005 Innovations in American Government education finalists to understand what meaningful innovation in the education field looks like and how to promote it. The Innovations Awards finalists include promising initiatives such as Big Picture Company's efforts to promote more personalized high school and High Tech High's effort in San Diego to develop a model that integrates technology throughout a rigorous high school curriculum. However, to date, educational innovation has had a limited reach and modest impact due in large part to a bureaucratic system that discourages entrepreneurial personalities while rewarding employees who respect the standard rules and procedures. In order to harness the power of these innovative education programs, schooling needs to be reformed so that it no longer merely tolerates entrepreneurs but fosters their efforts, rewards their successes and encourages their growth.

In February and March 2005 research was carried out in Tanah Datar District, West Sumatra Province, Indonesia for one of nine case studies in support of a World Bank analytical project, “Making Services Work For the Poor.” The objective of the case studies was to illustrate the impact of service delivery innovation on (a) stakeholders’ behavior and (b) access to and quality of the service. The Ash Institute of Democratic Governance and Innovation, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, in collaboration with the Ford Foundation International Innovations Liaison Group, has served as a partner in this project Two innovative education policies are highlighted in this case study: the Stronger Incentives Policy, which rewarded best-performing English teachers and headmasters with training and study visits overseas, and the Smaller Classes Policy, which limited class size in senior high schools to 30 students. As a result of the new policies, over 70 school staff were sent overseas, all public (but not all private) senior high schools, as well as some junior high and elementary schools, have cut class sizes. Key changes in attitude and behavior included increased motivation to do better work on the part of English teachers and headmasters, changes in teaching methodology on the part of some English teachers, increased interest in student performance on the part of teachers and headmasters, increased support for the Bupati (governor) by those who benefited from the policies, and an increase in reform mindedness of government education and school staff. Access to senior high school education decreased for some children. Changes in quality of education included improved teaching skills at the better schools, and broader educational offerings and better facilities at better schools. There was, however, an increased financial burden on some schools and parents, and an overall increase in inequity among schools. Key to the positive impact of the reforms were changes in national government policy, the vision, imagination and leadership of the Bupati, and effective policy implementation. Factors which limited positive impact included inadequate dissemination of the new policies, lack of follow-up from study trips, the decision not to legalize the Stronger Incentives Policy, insufficient numbers of classrooms, and limited targeting of the poor and disadvantaged.

Decentralization paved the way for the Creating Learning Communities for Children (CLCC) program designed by UNICEF, UNESCO, and the Indonesian Department of Education in 1999, which aims to improve primary school education quality. CLCC’s school-based management (SBM) component targets increased community, and especially parents’, support for children’s education, while its active, joyful, effective learning (AJEL) component aims to strengthen children’s critical and creative thinking. This case study examined CLCC’s impact in two schools of Polman district, West Sulawesi province: one poor, rural school targeted by CLCC, and one better-off, urban school which adopted CLCC on its own. Accountability of school management improved at the better-off school, due largely to the school’s democratically-inclined headmaster, but SBM was a failure at the poorer school largely due to an autocratic headmaster and parents’ and School Committee members’ passivity. In both schools, AJEL dramatically changed teaching methods and increased student and parent participation, due to both headmaster support and the effectiveness of AJEL tools. For poor parents, reliance not just on formal communication via the School Committee but on informal communication (including an innovative school radio program) were key. At neither school have national exam scores or drop-out rates improved relative to those of neighboring non-CLCC schools. School attendance, however, improved, teaching methods improved, and students and parents both became more involved in school, so perhaps there is a mismatch between AJEL tools and exam subjects, or the national exam does not reflect the type of knowledge gained from AJEL. Since 2001, the district has expanded CLCC to 70 new schools using its own funding; local innovators have spread it to about 30 more schools. UNICEF financial support for CLCC ends in December 2005, and the program’s long-term sustainability is an open question. Greater community support is crucial for financial sustainability, particularly at the poorer school. The introduction of AJEL to secondary schools may be key to ensuring sustainability of impact. Finally, for institutional sustainability, the District Bureau of Education, ostensibly in charge of the program but unenthusiastic about it, must be convinced. Better monitoring of program impact might help to bring this reluctant agency on board.

Founded in 1999, the Bandung Institute of Governance Studies (BIGS) is an NGO devoted to promoting budget transparency in Bandung city, West Java province. To date, BIGS has been successful in obtaining and disseminating city budget information, publishing several books as well as an annual poster which lists the budget allocations and unit manager names and telephone numbers for all 80 city government units. It has provided citizens, politicians, NGO staff, the media and students with training on how to analyze and use budget information in advocacy efforts. Information provided by BIGS has empowered the city parliament or DPRD to strengthen its role as a check on the executive branch of city government and is being used by government to reduce budgetary fraud and waste. BIGS has even taken some direct action of its own, bringing a well-publicized case of corruption against some Bandung city DPRD members that is still under investigation. Bandung city citizens’ awareness of the importance of the budget and the need for budget transparency has been raised, and the issue of budget transparency is being taken up in other cities and by other NGOs because of BIGS. Key to BIGS’ success has been its ability to bring its strategy in line with its organizational strengths and weaknesses. Other important factors include its reputation for honesty, excellence and sincerity, its charismatic leader, multi-year untied core funding, its wide network of government contacts, and its use of many different channels and formats to reach people. Finally, national-level decentralization and accompanying reforms created an enabling environment for organizations such as BIGS. Despite BIGS’ successes, BIGS’ work has not yet resulted in a more pro-poor city budget. Perhaps most importantly, BIGS depends on other NGOs to serve as “pollinators” to put its information to work on behalf of specific groups such as the poor. In fact, BIGS does not target the poor explicitly, though budget analysis, training, and information dissemination are all activities that could be effectively re-designed with the poor in mind. BIGS’ citizen outreach is limited in both numbers and impact: a frequent criticism is that its budget analysis is too complicated for ordinary citizens to understand and use. The fact that it does not publish information on draft budgets, but only on approved budgets, also limits the ability of citizens and NGOs to use the information for change. Finally, entrenched local groups and dishonest leaders undermine some of BIGS’ attempts at reducing budgetary fraud and waste.

This paper examines how city governments can collaborate with faith-based organizations, and invigorate these partners, around a citywide housing agenda. Specifically, the paper explores: (1) why city hall/FBO collaborations are important; (2) what FBOs bring to housing efforts; (3) how cities can more effectively collaborate with FBOs; (4) lessons on collaboration from the various 'Unlocking Doors' cities; and, (5) a case study on city hall/FBO collaboration in the city of Nashville. The goal of this paper is to fill the gap of practical knowledge on collaborations with the faith community by presenting a framework to help city halls more intentionally leverage successful partnerships, based on lessons learned from other local cases.

The Jaminan Kesehatan Jembrana (JKJ or Jembrana Health Insurance) scheme begun in Jembrana District, Bali Province in March 2003 provides free primary healthcare to all members; free secondary and tertiary care is also provided for poor members. The scheme has improved the access of both poor and non-poor citizens to healthcare. Before JKJ, only 17 percent of district citizens were covered by any kind of health insurance; now, 63 percent are covered. The percentage of ill people who sought treatment in Jembrana more than doubled from 40 percent in 2003 to 90 percent in 2004. For the poor, the increase was from 29 to 80 percent. Increased access of the poor to health services is due primarily to the inclusion of private providers in the JKJ scheme. Though on paper, out-of-pocket healthcare costs have increased sharply for poor non-members, in practice most public providers still provide free care for all poor clients. This increases access of even non-member poor to healthcare, but subjects them to the discretion of providers who have the legal right to refuse them free services. Meanwhile, JKJ registration requirements have kept many of the poor from joining. JKJ’s attempts to become self-financing have focused recently on a new onemembership-card-per-person system (rather than the old one-card-per-family scheme), and this is likely behind a drop in membership of the poor, from 66 percent in 2004 to 22 percent (re-registered under the new system) by May 2005, since many poor families cannot afford to re-enroll all members. By increasing access to private providers, JKJ has increased competition between public clinics and private doctors for clients. JKJ has also improved both healthcare quality and client satisfaction. It is likely that JKJ’s enforcement of strict standards on equipment, treatment, medication, and referral has contributed to the improvement. JKJ does not, however, appear to be financially sustainable. There has been a rapid, unbudgeted increase in district spending on JKJ. JKJ’s inclusion of non-poor citizens adds greatly to its cost—in 2004, 95 percent of the Rp. 9.5 billion in JKJ claims were made for services to non-poor clients. The informal inclusion of poor non-members also increases JKJ costs, as those who provide free services to poor non-members are in fact usually reimbursed by JKJ. Finally, investment in JKJ administration is grossly inadequate, and JKJ’s legal basis is challenged by a 2004 law centralizing health insurance.

The nine Making Services Work for the Poor (MSWP) case studies synthesized in this paper reviewed innovations in service delivery at the local level in Indonesia in the wake of decentralization. It is hoped that this synthesis will be useful to donors and government in Indonesia and other countries interested in practical ideas for improving local service delivery. About half the cases focus on externally driven innovations; half were led by locals. The innovations in nearly all cases have made a clear positive impact on service provision and reached a total of at least half a million people. Research was based on semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with approximately 600 people over 80 days of fieldwork in 25 villages and cities between February and April 2005.

Mapping Your Community's Faith-Based Assets was developed for public managers interested in strategically engaging their city's faith-based organizations. It serves as an easy-to-apply inventory tool that helps in identifying the potential areas for cross-sector collaboration with faith-based organizations. Too often, researchers and local governments overlook local faith-based organizations, particularly smaller ones, despite their important contributions to local communities. This tool should thus prove instructive to most local officials. This tool's six-step methodology will provide public managers with (1) a comprehensive listing of the local faith-based organizations in a geographically defined area, and (2) an opportunity inventory tool that lays out, in an easy-to-understand format, the faith-based assets in their communities. This tool is part of City Hall and Religion: An Online Curriculum for Public Managers. With support from the Pew Charitable Trusts, the City Hall and Religion curriculum was designed as a professional resource for mayors, and other public managers, interested in urban revitalization through cross-sector collaboration.

With the 2008 political season starting to heat up, The Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation and Visiting Fellow Prof. Kay Schlozman of Boston College took a look at the ways in which political arrangement impact citizenship in an April 27 workshop, "Practicing Democracy: How Political Arrangements Promote Equal Citizenship...or Not." The daylong workshop examined four key areas of political arrangements: political money and campaign finance; citizenship and enfranchisement; representing groups; and ballot integrity and prevention of electoral corruption. Experts from the Kennedy School of Government and across the county discussed American democratic practices in the context of political arrangements in other democracies-both long-established ones and, where appropriate, emerging ones. "Political arrangements can have consequences for equal citizenship in various ways," Schlozman explained; "for example, by controlling who is considered a citizen or which citizens have the right to participate fully in governing, or by facilitating or inhibiting the conversion of market resources into political influence."

This discussion paper outlines a recently started mixed method research program to assess whether, why, and in what contexts transparency and accountability (T/A) interventions improve health outcomes. The project is intended to advance the state of knowledge about the impact of T/A interventions on service delivery in several ways. First, we will develop a new T/A intervention, based on an initial theory about how T/A affects service delivery in different contexts as well as the range of existing work in this field, that is designed to be flexible enough to work across multiple contexts. Development of this intervention will leverage the local knowledge of embedded and capable local partners through an intensive co-design process. Second, we will conduct mixed-methods evaluations of this intervention in multiple sites: our research plan combines an initial phase in which we will evaluate its impact in two carefully selected sites, Tanzania and Indonesia, with both a randomized controlled trial and an integrated and extensive qualitative evaluation to understand mechanisms and the role of context; a cost-effectiveness analysis; and a second phase, which explores the generalizability of both our first phase results and the theoretical implications of them for mechanisms and the role of context. Third, these findings will provide the basis for development of a more nuanced and empirically grounded theory of the impact of T/A— both the different mechanisms through which T/A interventions seek to affect development outcomes, such as collaborative problem solving or community pressure, and the conditions under which these mechanisms should be expected to improve service delivery. All of these elements will be used to produce a range of new tools for practitioners of T/A as well as sectoral health experts assessing whether to add T/A interventions instead of or alongside more traditional health interventions.

On April 15, 2013, at 2:49 pm, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated near the finish line of the Boston Marathon. Three people died, and more than 260 others needed hospital care, many having lost limbs or suffered horrific wounds. Those explosions began about 100 hours of intense drama that riveted the attention of the nation. The response by emergency medical, emergency management, and law enforcement agencies and by the public at large has now become known colloquially as ”Boston Strong.” This report, through analysis of selected aspects of the Marathon events, seeks lessons that can help response organizations in Boston and other locales improve preparation both for emergencies that may occur at ”fixed” events like the Marathon and for ”no notice” events like those that began with the murder of Officer Collier at MIT and concluded the next day with the apprehension of the alleged perpetrators in Watertown.

Senior government executives make many decisions, not-infrequently difficult ones. Cognitive limitations and biases preclude individuals from making fully value-maximizing choices. And the “groupthink” tradition has highlighted ways group-aided decision-making can fail to live up to its potential. Out of this literature has emerged a prescriptive paradigm Janis calls “vigilant decision-making.” For this paper, we interviewed twenty heads of subcabinet-level organizations in the U.S. federal government, asking each questions about how they made important decisions. Ten were nominated by “good-government” experts as ones doing an outstanding job improving the organization’s performance, ten chosen at random. The vigilant decision-making approach is designed for difficult decisions, presumed to be informationally, technically, or politically complex. However, we found that when we asked these executives to discuss their most difficult decision, most identified decisions that were not informationally complex but instead mainly required courage to make. In this context, the vigilant decision-making paradigm might be more problematic than the literature suggests. We discuss here the different demands for decisions involving complexity and those involving courage, and suggest a contingency model of good decision-making processes that requires executives and advisors to be ambidextrous in their approaches.

Senior government executives make many decisions, not-infrequently difficult ones. Cognitive limitations and biases preclude individuals from making fully value-maximizing choices. It has been suggested that, done properly, involving advisors or other outside information sources can compensate for individual-level limitations. However, the “groupthink” tradition has highlighted ways group-aided decision-making can fail to live up to its potential. Out of this literature has emerged a paradigm Janis calls “vigilant problem-solving.” For this paper, we interviewed twenty heads of subcabinet-level organizations in the U.S. federal government, asking each questions about how they made important decisions. Ten were nominated by “good-government” experts as ones doing an outstanding job improving the organization’s performance, ten chosen at random. Our research question was to see whether there were significant differences in how members of those two groups made decisions, specifically, to what extent executives in the two categories used a “vigilant” decision-making process. We found, however, that similarities between the two groups of executives overwhelmed differences: at least as best as we were able to measure it, decision-making by U.S. subcabinet executives tracks vigilant decision-making recommendations fairly closely. The similarity suggests a common style of senior-level decision-making in the U.S. federal government, which we suggest grows out of a government bureaucracy’s methodical culture. We did, however, develop evidence for a difference between outstanding executives and others on another dimension of decision- making style. Outstanding executives valued decisiveness in decision-making – a “bias for action” – more than controls. Perhaps, then, what distinguishes outstanding executives from others is not vigilance but decisiveness. Contrary to the implications of the groupthink literature, the danger in government may be “paralysis by analysis” as much or more than groupthink.

A recent survey asks citizens from 30 countries for their views on 10 influential national leaders who have a global impact (see Appendix). There are many rich findings among the data. However, two general trends stand out. The first is that the responses are influenced by geopolitics. Differences between nations and national leaders are clearly reflected in the attitudes of their own citizens. Thus, it is plain that the tensions between China and Japan result in very poor evaluations of China and its leader by Japanese citizens and vice versa. Second, there is a correlation in responses between the nature of the political system and citizen opinions of their own nation’s leader. On the whole, in multiparty systems or genuine two-party systems such as in Europe and the U.S., citizens are more critical of their national leaders and policies than is the case in those nations where politics is less contested.

Myanmar has much less electricity per person than most Asian nations and also has a lower share of households getting grid power than its neighbors. While the supply of electricity has begun to rise in recent years, the hydro capacity and natural gas expected to be available from 2014-2019 will be insufficient to meet demand in the near future. This paper explores constraints to scaling up capacity and offers suggestions of medium term and long term steps to boost energy supply for Myanmar.

The Transparency for Development Evaluation Design Report describes the mixed methods evaluation design for the Transparency for Development project as of February 2015 – just before the start of the first data collection activities associated with the project (baseline data collection in Indonesia).

Since the writing of this report, a number of changes have been made to the design. For the most recent details, visit t4dproject.org.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of the current socioeconomic conditions in Myanmar's Rakhine State and to evaluate the prospects of accelerating economic development as a way of reducing tensions between Muslim and Buddhist groups. There has been significant conflict in recent years which has continued sporadically into 2014, resulting in severe hardship for approximately 140,000 Muslim refugees and significant damage to the local economy. The tensions also weaken the country by presenting a challenge to a potential framework for federalism by undermining stability and thus the confidence of potential investors. They also risk drawing in Muslim extremists outside the country. Drawing on historical information and on conversations conducted with a variety of Rakhine (Buddhist) business, civil society, political and government people, this study reviews the demographic trends affecting the state to separate fact from fiction and sheds light on the impact of current policies on the state's potential for economic development. Areas for working toward reconciliation are explored, and options such as promoting shared stakes in local resources and governance are discussed.

From time to time, the attention of the media in the United States and around world turns to China’s National People’s Congress (NPC), typically around the time the NPC meets in March. This paper is intended to provide an overview of the NPC's role in China's governmental hierarchy, its functions, and its membership.

Myanmar has less electricity per capita than Bangladesh and only a third of its population is connected to grid electricity. Although Myanmar has huge reserves of potential hydroelectricity, this paper argues that more is at stake than electricity supply, and that the political implications of hydro development are crucial to a peaceful and united future for Myanmar. It cautions that hydroelectric projects undertaken in the past decade had exceedingly disadvantageous terms that serve Myanmar poorly, and that if a stable political framework that promotes national unity is going to be realized, how hydroelectricity projects are approved and developed, and how the revenue benefits are distributed are as important as the electricity itself.

In this report, Innovations in American Government Fellow Charles Chieppo outlines a number of reforms intended to put the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority’s (MBTA) fiscal house in order. Specifically, Chieppo notes that the MBTA Fiscal Management and Control Board found that the T is looking at a $170 million shortfall for the current fiscal year, which is projected to grow to $427 million by fiscal year 2020. With increases in expenses far outpacing revenue growth, absent reform, the T’s financial problems will continue to compound in future years leading to deteriorating infrastructure and faltering service levels.