HKS Ash Center

With the 2008 political season starting to heat up, The Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation and Visiting Fellow Prof. Kay Schlozman of Boston College took a look at the ways in which political arrangement impact citizenship in an April 27 workshop, "Practicing Democracy: How Political Arrangements Promote Equal Citizenship...or Not." The daylong workshop examined four key areas of political arrangements: political money and campaign finance; citizenship and enfranchisement; representing groups; and ballot integrity and prevention of electoral corruption. Experts from the Kennedy School of Government and across the county discussed American democratic practices in the context of political arrangements in other democracies-both long-established ones and, where appropriate, emerging ones. "Political arrangements can have consequences for equal citizenship in various ways," Schlozman explained; "for example, by controlling who is considered a citizen or which citizens have the right to participate fully in governing, or by facilitating or inhibiting the conversion of market resources into political influence."

The nine Making Services Work for the Poor (MSWP) case studies synthesized in this paper reviewed innovations in service delivery at the local level in Indonesia in the wake of decentralization. It is hoped that this synthesis will be useful to donors and government in Indonesia and other countries interested in practical ideas for improving local service delivery. About half the cases focus on externally driven innovations; half were led by locals. The innovations in nearly all cases have made a clear positive impact on service provision and reached a total of at least half a million people. Research was based on semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with approximately 600 people over 80 days of fieldwork in 25 villages and cities between February and April 2005.

The Jaminan Kesehatan Jembrana (JKJ or Jembrana Health Insurance) scheme begun in Jembrana District, Bali Province in March 2003 provides free primary healthcare to all members; free secondary and tertiary care is also provided for poor members. The scheme has improved the access of both poor and non-poor citizens to healthcare. Before JKJ, only 17 percent of district citizens were covered by any kind of health insurance; now, 63 percent are covered. The percentage of ill people who sought treatment in Jembrana more than doubled from 40 percent in 2003 to 90 percent in 2004. For the poor, the increase was from 29 to 80 percent. Increased access of the poor to health services is due primarily to the inclusion of private providers in the JKJ scheme. Though on paper, out-of-pocket healthcare costs have increased sharply for poor non-members, in practice most public providers still provide free care for all poor clients. This increases access of even non-member poor to healthcare, but subjects them to the discretion of providers who have the legal right to refuse them free services. Meanwhile, JKJ registration requirements have kept many of the poor from joining. JKJ’s attempts to become self-financing have focused recently on a new onemembership-card-per-person system (rather than the old one-card-per-family scheme), and this is likely behind a drop in membership of the poor, from 66 percent in 2004 to 22 percent (re-registered under the new system) by May 2005, since many poor families cannot afford to re-enroll all members. By increasing access to private providers, JKJ has increased competition between public clinics and private doctors for clients. JKJ has also improved both healthcare quality and client satisfaction. It is likely that JKJ’s enforcement of strict standards on equipment, treatment, medication, and referral has contributed to the improvement. JKJ does not, however, appear to be financially sustainable. There has been a rapid, unbudgeted increase in district spending on JKJ. JKJ’s inclusion of non-poor citizens adds greatly to its cost—in 2004, 95 percent of the Rp. 9.5 billion in JKJ claims were made for services to non-poor clients. The informal inclusion of poor non-members also increases JKJ costs, as those who provide free services to poor non-members are in fact usually reimbursed by JKJ. Finally, investment in JKJ administration is grossly inadequate, and JKJ’s legal basis is challenged by a 2004 law centralizing health insurance.

Founded in 1999, the Bandung Institute of Governance Studies (BIGS) is an NGO devoted to promoting budget transparency in Bandung city, West Java province. To date, BIGS has been successful in obtaining and disseminating city budget information, publishing several books as well as an annual poster which lists the budget allocations and unit manager names and telephone numbers for all 80 city government units. It has provided citizens, politicians, NGO staff, the media and students with training on how to analyze and use budget information in advocacy efforts. Information provided by BIGS has empowered the city parliament or DPRD to strengthen its role as a check on the executive branch of city government and is being used by government to reduce budgetary fraud and waste. BIGS has even taken some direct action of its own, bringing a well-publicized case of corruption against some Bandung city DPRD members that is still under investigation. Bandung city citizens’ awareness of the importance of the budget and the need for budget transparency has been raised, and the issue of budget transparency is being taken up in other cities and by other NGOs because of BIGS. Key to BIGS’ success has been its ability to bring its strategy in line with its organizational strengths and weaknesses. Other important factors include its reputation for honesty, excellence and sincerity, its charismatic leader, multi-year untied core funding, its wide network of government contacts, and its use of many different channels and formats to reach people. Finally, national-level decentralization and accompanying reforms created an enabling environment for organizations such as BIGS. Despite BIGS’ successes, BIGS’ work has not yet resulted in a more pro-poor city budget. Perhaps most importantly, BIGS depends on other NGOs to serve as “pollinators” to put its information to work on behalf of specific groups such as the poor. In fact, BIGS does not target the poor explicitly, though budget analysis, training, and information dissemination are all activities that could be effectively re-designed with the poor in mind. BIGS’ citizen outreach is limited in both numbers and impact: a frequent criticism is that its budget analysis is too complicated for ordinary citizens to understand and use. The fact that it does not publish information on draft budgets, but only on approved budgets, also limits the ability of citizens and NGOs to use the information for change. Finally, entrenched local groups and dishonest leaders undermine some of BIGS’ attempts at reducing budgetary fraud and waste.

In June 2020, the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the digital transfor- mation consultancy Public Digital hosted digital service groups from around the world for their annual Digital Services Convening. The goal of the convening is to accelerate effective and equitable digital trans- formation in government by creating a space for digital service groups to share best practices and lessons. Now in its third year, the convening has become a place for honest reflection about the challenges facing digital service groups regarding what is and is not working in the field. Normally, teams gather in person on Harvard’s campus. This year, because of the COVID-19 pandem- ic, we gathered virtually. This online forum allowed us to convene over 100 attendees from more than 40 different digital service groups for three days of discussion. Each day had a theme. Day one focused on the “now,” examining digital teams’ responses to the pandemic. Day two focused on “later,” and highlighted long-term opportunities for digital teams. The final day was about what’s “next,” focusing on priorities and opportunities for the next six to 12 months. Teams that participated in the summit use different approaches and methodologies in vastly different contexts. Some of those—such as Estonia and Bangladesh—are building on a decade or more of experi- ence and are refining established, advanced practices; others—such as the state of Colorado—formally launched just recently. Some groups are embedded in the executive branch, while others are tightly focused within a single agency. A novel addition this year was digital teams that operate alongside, but outside of, governments— such as the Nordic Institute for Interoperable Solutions (NIIS) and the Bangalore-based Modular Open Source Identity Platform (MOSIP). As always, this diversity led to great learnings about the opportunities and challenges of digital ser- vices today. This report, prepared in consultation with some of the presenters, documents a few of these learnings in an effort to share some of the big picture insights raised at the convening with a broader audience. We hope you find these reflections useful and welcome continued conversation on the ideas presented here.

Mapping Your Community's Faith-Based Assets was developed for public managers interested in strategically engaging their city's faith-based organizations. It serves as an easy-to-apply inventory tool that helps in identifying the potential areas for cross-sector collaboration with faith-based organizations. Too often, researchers and local governments overlook local faith-based organizations, particularly smaller ones, despite their important contributions to local communities. This tool should thus prove instructive to most local officials. This tool's six-step methodology will provide public managers with (1) a comprehensive listing of the local faith-based organizations in a geographically defined area, and (2) an opportunity inventory tool that lays out, in an easy-to-understand format, the faith-based assets in their communities. This tool is part of City Hall and Religion: An Online Curriculum for Public Managers. With support from the Pew Charitable Trusts, the City Hall and Religion curriculum was designed as a professional resource for mayors, and other public managers, interested in urban revitalization through cross-sector collaboration.

This paper examines how city governments can collaborate with faith-based organizations, and invigorate these partners, around a citywide housing agenda. Specifically, the paper explores: (1) why city hall/FBO collaborations are important; (2) what FBOs bring to housing efforts; (3) how cities can more effectively collaborate with FBOs; (4) lessons on collaboration from the various 'Unlocking Doors' cities; and, (5) a case study on city hall/FBO collaboration in the city of Nashville. The goal of this paper is to fill the gap of practical knowledge on collaborations with the faith community by presenting a framework to help city halls more intentionally leverage successful partnerships, based on lessons learned from other local cases.

Decentralization paved the way for the Creating Learning Communities for Children (CLCC) program designed by UNICEF, UNESCO, and the Indonesian Department of Education in 1999, which aims to improve primary school education quality. CLCC’s school-based management (SBM) component targets increased community, and especially parents’, support for children’s education, while its active, joyful, effective learning (AJEL) component aims to strengthen children’s critical and creative thinking. This case study examined CLCC’s impact in two schools of Polman district, West Sulawesi province: one poor, rural school targeted by CLCC, and one better-off, urban school which adopted CLCC on its own. Accountability of school management improved at the better-off school, due largely to the school’s democratically-inclined headmaster, but SBM was a failure at the poorer school largely due to an autocratic headmaster and parents’ and School Committee members’ passivity. In both schools, AJEL dramatically changed teaching methods and increased student and parent participation, due to both headmaster support and the effectiveness of AJEL tools. For poor parents, reliance not just on formal communication via the School Committee but on informal communication (including an innovative school radio program) were key. At neither school have national exam scores or drop-out rates improved relative to those of neighboring non-CLCC schools. School attendance, however, improved, teaching methods improved, and students and parents both became more involved in school, so perhaps there is a mismatch between AJEL tools and exam subjects, or the national exam does not reflect the type of knowledge gained from AJEL. Since 2001, the district has expanded CLCC to 70 new schools using its own funding; local innovators have spread it to about 30 more schools. UNICEF financial support for CLCC ends in December 2005, and the program’s long-term sustainability is an open question. Greater community support is crucial for financial sustainability, particularly at the poorer school. The introduction of AJEL to secondary schools may be key to ensuring sustainability of impact. Finally, for institutional sustainability, the District Bureau of Education, ostensibly in charge of the program but unenthusiastic about it, must be convinced. Better monitoring of program impact might help to bring this reluctant agency on board.

In February and March 2005 research was carried out in Tanah Datar District, West Sumatra Province, Indonesia for one of nine case studies in support of a World Bank analytical project, “Making Services Work For the Poor.” The objective of the case studies was to illustrate the impact of service delivery innovation on (a) stakeholders’ behavior and (b) access to and quality of the service. The Ash Institute of Democratic Governance and Innovation, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, in collaboration with the Ford Foundation International Innovations Liaison Group, has served as a partner in this project Two innovative education policies are highlighted in this case study: the Stronger Incentives Policy, which rewarded best-performing English teachers and headmasters with training and study visits overseas, and the Smaller Classes Policy, which limited class size in senior high schools to 30 students. As a result of the new policies, over 70 school staff were sent overseas, all public (but not all private) senior high schools, as well as some junior high and elementary schools, have cut class sizes. Key changes in attitude and behavior included increased motivation to do better work on the part of English teachers and headmasters, changes in teaching methodology on the part of some English teachers, increased interest in student performance on the part of teachers and headmasters, increased support for the Bupati (governor) by those who benefited from the policies, and an increase in reform mindedness of government education and school staff. Access to senior high school education decreased for some children. Changes in quality of education included improved teaching skills at the better schools, and broader educational offerings and better facilities at better schools. There was, however, an increased financial burden on some schools and parents, and an overall increase in inequity among schools. Key to the positive impact of the reforms were changes in national government policy, the vision, imagination and leadership of the Bupati, and effective policy implementation. Factors which limited positive impact included inadequate dissemination of the new policies, lack of follow-up from study trips, the decision not to legalize the Stronger Incentives Policy, insufficient numbers of classrooms, and limited targeting of the poor and disadvantaged.

This report draws on the 2005 Innovations in American Government education finalists to understand what meaningful innovation in the education field looks like and how to promote it. The Innovations Awards finalists include promising initiatives such as Big Picture Company's efforts to promote more personalized high school and High Tech High's effort in San Diego to develop a model that integrates technology throughout a rigorous high school curriculum. However, to date, educational innovation has had a limited reach and modest impact due in large part to a bureaucratic system that discourages entrepreneurial personalities while rewarding employees who respect the standard rules and procedures. In order to harness the power of these innovative education programs, schooling needs to be reformed so that it no longer merely tolerates entrepreneurs but fosters their efforts, rewards their successes and encourages their growth.