Center for Public Leadership
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Building State CapabilityItem type:Collection, - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Proceedings of the 14th annual conference of INEBRIA: New York, NY, USA, September 14–15, 2017(BioMed Central, 2017) ;Holloway, Aisha S. ;Ferguson, Jennifer ;Landale, Sarah ;Cariola, LauraNewbury-Birch, Dorothy - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Targeted Programs in an Economic Crisis: Empirical Findings from Indonesia’s Experience(Center for International Development at Harvard University, 2002-09); ;Sumarto, SudarnoSuryahadi, AsepIn response to the economic, natural, and political crisis that enveloped Indonesia from August 1997 (beginning of depreciation) to May 1998 (resignation of Soeharto), the new government announced support for a set of “safety net” (JPS) programs in July 1998 budget. These included: (a) targeted sales of subsidized rice, (b) work creation programs, (c) scholarships to students and block grants to schools, (d) targeted health care subsidies, (e) community block grants. We used cross sectional and panel data to examine the targeting of these programs. First, "static participation incidence" (the relationship between program participation and household consumption expenditures) was substantially better than a uniform transfer, but substantially worse than perfect targeting --and remarkably similar for all of the JPS programs. Second, unlike standard static incidence measures, what we define as dynamic participation incidence — the relationship between changes in consumption expenditures and program participation — was very different between the JPS programs. The employment creation programs which relied on self-selection targeting was much more likely to reach those households with large shocks to their expenditures than programs based on administrative targeting such as subsidized rice sales, scholarships, and health subsidies. Third, larger coverage does not lead to either better or worse targeting: there is no general tendency across the programs for marginal incidence to be above, or below, average incidence. Fourth, the targeting design of many of the programs was not followed strictly in implementation in all of the programs. Community and individual characteristics that were de jure irrelevant played a role in targeting in practice. In the rice program, community influence led to the program going to many more than the eligible individuals. In other programs, individual characteristics appear to have influenced targeting. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Is Black Economic Empowerment a South African Growth Catalyst? (Or Could it Be...)(Center for International Development at Harvard University, 2008-05)This study asks the question, “Is Black Economic Empowerment a South African growth catalyst?” It addresses the question with reference to the theoretical literature on economic and organizational structures. This literature argues that structures reflect values and influence patterns of behavior, empowerment and opportunities for economic growth. The paper shows that South Africa’s economic structures have had negative influences on both racial access and economic opportunity, creativity and responsiveness. The proposition is that transformation and growth require change in economic structures; the same BEE-induced changes will work for both goals. However, some observe that BEE is not effecting change. This raises a counter proposition that BEE will not catalyze growth. The two propositions are examined in a study of BEE responses in twenty-five JSE listed firms. The basic finding is that while firms are actively responding to BEE requirements they are also doing so within a static structural context, where firms keep looking to established networks for solutions. This limits the number of beneficiaries of BEE. It also exacerbates constraints on the number of people in these groups—especially manifesting in added pressure on skilled groups. A number of firms are also not developing vertical connections that might open opportunities for entrepreneurs. Firms that are developing vertical connections are creating capacities to bridge the network divides that exist. The payoff seems very high in these initiatives, evident in trained and screened talent, new jobs and new enterprises. These findings lead the paper into a discussion of what could be done to improve BEE—such that it does become a policy that catalyzes growth. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Deals Versus Rules: Policy Implementation Uncertainty and Why Firms Hate It(Center for International Development at Harvard University, 2010-10) ;Hallward-Driemeier, Mary ;Khun-Jush, GitaFirms in Africa report "regulatory and economic policy uncertainty" as a top constraint to their growth. We argue that often firms in Africa do not cope with policy rules, rather they face deals; firm-specific policy actions that can be influenced by firm actions (e.g. bribes) and characteristics (e.g. political connections). Using Enterprise Survey data we demonstrate huge variability in reported policy actions across firms notionally facing the same policy. The within-country dispersion in firm-specific policy actions is larger than the cross-national differences in average policy. We show that variability in this policy implementation uncertainty within location-sector-size cells is correlated with firm growth rates. These measures of implementation variability are more strongly related to lower firm employment growth than are measures of "average" policy action. Finally, we show that the de jure measures such as Doing Business indicators are virtually uncorrelated with ex-post firm-level responses, further evidence that deals rather than rules prevail in Africa. Strikingly, the gap between de jure and de facto conditions grows with the formal regulatory burden. The evidence also shows more burdensome processes open up more space for making deals; firms may not incur the official costs of compliance, but they still pay to avoid them. Finally, measures of institutional capacity and better governance are closely associated with perceived consistency in implementation. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, How Far Have Public Financial Management Reforms Come in Africa?(Center for International Development at Harvard University, 2010-10)This paper asks how strong African Public Financial Management (PFM) has become, after a decade and more of reform. How well do African PFM systems in place now facilitate effective public financial management? Where are the next challenges and how can they be met? It analyzes recent PFM assessments in 31 governments to answer these questions, identifying patterns of strengths and weaknesses across the PFM system and across countries. In respect of the former, the study finds that budgets are made better than they are executed, practice lags behind the creation of processes and laws, and processes are stronger where concentrated actors are engaged. In respect of the latter, the study finds that different countries fall into different 'PFM performance leagues' and countries in the different leagues look very different to each other. A range of factors influence which league a country is associated with; including economic growth, stability, reform tenure and colonial heritage. On the basis of this evidence, the paper argues that existing reforms face limits that can only be overcome with adjustments in reform approach; with less focus on pushing reform technicalities and more on creating 'space' in which reform takes place, less concentration of engagements with small sets of actors and more on expanding engagements, and less emphasis on reproducing the same reform models and more on better understanding what context-appropriate reforms look like. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Development as Leadership-led Change(Center for International Development at Harvard University, 2010-10); ;McConnell, JesseWescott, AlisonDevelopment involves change, but many development initiatives produce unimpressive results. The authors ask why and consider how to close the gap between the intended change and what we actually see in the evidence. This paper presents the findings of a study, initiated by the multi-donor Global Leadership Initiative and led by the World Bank Institute (WBI), to examine leadership in the change processes of fourteen capacity development interventions in eight developing countries, through 140 in-depth structured interviews. It explores what it takes to make change happen and in particular, the role leadership plays in effecting change. The authors propose that leadership contributes to change when it builds "change space" by fostering acceptance for change, granting authority for change, introducing or freeing the abilities necessary to achieve change. This "change space" is required to ensure contextual readiness for change and foster progress through the difficult stages of the change process. An analytical framework is introduced to illustrate the dimensions of this "change space" and its limits in organizational and social change. The authors argue that a lack of "change space" in many development contexts may be overlooked, contributing to failure. The paper concludes that leadership manifests in different ways in different contexts, depending on the contextual readiness and factors that shape change and leadership opportunities; but the key characteristics of plurality, functionality, problem orientation and "change space" creation are likely to be common to all successful leadership-led change events. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, How Business is Done and the 'Doing Business' Indicators: The Investment Climate when Firms have Climate Control(Center for International Development at Harvard University, 2010-11) ;Hallward-Driemeier, Mary"Doing Business" (DB) provides measures of the time and costs associated with fully complying with an array of business regulations. Enterprise Surveys (ES) ask a wide range of firms about their actual experiences in doing business. We use three comparable indicators in both: time to get an operating permit, time to get a construction permit, and time to import goods, to compare these distinct de jure (DB) and de facto (ES) approaches to assessing the "investment climate" in over 100 countries. Four patterns emerge in each of the three indicators. First, while the DB, of necessity, reports a single estimate of the days for compliance for each indicator, firms in the same country report wildly different times to complete the same transaction. For instance, the DB indicators says it takes 65 days to start a business in Ecuador, whereas the distribution of the 265 firms who reported getting an operating license was between a 10th percentile reporting 1 day while the 90th percentile reporting 60 days. Second, regulatory compliance appears to be "under water" as firms report actual times much less than the DB reported days. For instance, the median DB time to obtain a construction permit across all countries is 210 days, while the mean of the days firms reported was 59, the median DB-ES "under water" gap was 145 days. Third, cross-nationally there is very little association between the ES distributions and DB numbers. A naïve view of "full compliance" might suggest that actually reported days would rise one for one with DB days, but the patterns are much more complex. The de jure environment appears to only affect some firms. For instance, as the de jure DB time to get a construction permit rose across countries by 524 days (from 77 to 601) the predicted time reported by the 25th percentile "favored" firm rose by just 2.7 days. In contrast, the time reported by the "disfavored" 90th percentile firm rose by 130 days, but all of this rise comes in the lower range of the DB. Fourth, for those countries with multiple ES surveys we find little association over time, with reductions in DB days as likely to be accompanied by increases in ES days. Comparing these two measures suggests very different ways of thinking about policy versus policy implementation, about what "climate" means, and what the options for "policy reform" really are. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Governance Indicators Can Make Sense: Under-five Mortality Rates are an Example(Center for International Development at Harvard University, 2010-10); ;Hay, RogerMyers, JerrettGovernance indicators have come under fire in recent years, especially the World Governance Indicators (WGIs). Critics present these indicators as a-theoretical and biased. Critics of the critics counter that no better alternatives exist. We suggest otherwise, arguing that more appropriate 'governance' indicators will (i) have theoretical grounding, (ii) focus on specific fields of engagement, (iii) emphasize outcomes, and (iv) control for key contextual differences in comparing countries. Such measures can help indicate where countries seem to have governance problems, allowing second stage analyses of what these problems are. We present under national five mortality rates adjusted for country income groups as an example of such measure, presenting data for contextually controlled outcomes in this specific field to show where governance seems better and worse. The United States is shown up as relatively weak, whereas a country like Pakistan seems to have better governance in this sector than other low income countries. The indicator allows questions about why governance of this sector might be problematic in certain contexts and easier in others. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Escaping Capability Traps through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)(Center for International Development at Harvard University, 2012-06); ; Many reform initiatives in developing countries fail to achieve sustained improvements in performance because they are merely isomorphic mimicry—that is, governments and organizations pretend to reform by changing what policies or organizations look like rather than what they actually do. The flow of development resources and legitimacy without demonstrated improvements in performance, however, undermines the impetus for effective action to build state capability or improve performance. This dynamic facilitates 'capability traps' in which state capability stagnates, or even deteriorates, over long periods of time despite governments remaining engaged in developmental rhetoric and continuing to receive development resources. How can countries escape capability traps? We propose an approach, Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA), based on four core principles, each of which stands in sharp contrast with the standard approaches. First, PDIA focuses on solving locally nominated and defined problems in performance (as opposed to transplanting pre-conceived and packaged "best practice" solutions). Second, it seeks to create an 'authorizing environment' for decision-making that encourages 'positive deviance' and experimentation (as opposed to designing projects and programs and then requiring agents to implement them exactly as designed). Third, it embeds this experimentation in tight feedback loops that facilitate rapid experiential learning (as opposed to enduring long lag times in learning from ex post "evaluation"). Fourth, it actively engages broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate, relevant and supportable (as opposed to a narrow set of external experts promoting the "top down" diffusion of innovation).