When Does Vladimir Putin’s Russia Intervene Militarily and Why?

Abstract

This article explores what drove Vladimir Putin’s decisions on whether to intervene in foreign countries militarily or not during the 21 full years of his rule (2000-2020). The author first infers hypothetical drivers of military interventions from the academic literature on the subject. The author then explores whether any of the drivers, which he has inferred from the literature, have been present in instances when, as indicated by the evidence that is presented in this article, Putin was likely to have deliberated whether to use military force in foreign countries. The author examines seven such instances, including three instances in which the Russian leader ultimately decided to intervene and four instances in which he did not during that period. This examination revealed that a confluence of three drivers was both necessary and sufficient for Putin not just to seriously consider a military intervention abroad but to actually order one. First, Putin had to be directly motivated by a clear, acute threat to one or more of Russia’s vital national interests. Second, he had to have reasonable hope that a military intervention would succeed in warding off this threat, with such hope acting as one of the facilitators of his decision to opt for a military intervention. Third, Putin had either to have run out of non-military and, therefore, less costly options of responding to these threats or to lack the time needed to exercise such options due to the acutely urgent nature of the threats. These findings could constitute a modest contribution to the body of academic knowledge about use of force by post-Soviet Russia against other countries, in the author’s view. These findings may have practical implications, as they may be used to help forecast Russian military interventions.