Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • Interim Correlated Rationalizability 

      Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen (Society for Economic Theory, 2007)
      This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This ...
    • The psychology of coordination and common knowledge. 

      Thomas, Kyle Andrew; DeScioli, Peter; Haque, Omar Sultan; Pinker, Steven (American Psychological Association (APA), 2014)
      Research on human cooperation has concentrated on the puzzle of altruism, in which one actor incurs a cost to benefit another, and the psychology of reciprocity, which evolved to solve this problem. We examine the complementary ...
    • Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium 

      Fudenberg, Drew; Kamada, Yuichiro (The Econometric Society, 2015)
      Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady-state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal ...
    • Topologies on Types 

      Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen (Society for Economic Theory, 2006)
      We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and ...