An Evolutionary Explanation for Ineffective Altruism
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An Evolutionary Explanation for Ineffective Altruism (68.58Kb)
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https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-00950-4Metadata
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Burum, Bethany, Nowak, Martin A, and Hoffman, Moshe. "An Evolutionary Explanation for Ineffective Altruism." Nature Human Behaviour 4, no. 12 (2020): 1245-257.Abstract
We donate billions to charities each year, yet much of our giving is ineffective. Why are we motivated to give but not to give effectively? Building on evolutionary game theory, we argue that donors evolved (genetically or culturally) to be insensitive to efficacy because people tend not to reward efficacy, as social rewards tend to depend on well-defined and highly observable behaviors. We present five experiments testing key predictions of this account that are difficult to reconcile with alternative accounts based on cognitive or emotional limitations. Namely, we show that donors are more sensitive to efficacy when helping (i) themselves or (ii) their family. Moreover, (iii) social rewarders don’t condition on efficacy or other difficult-to-observe behaviors (iv, v), like the amount donated.Citable link to this page
https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37374289
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