Coase versus the Coasians
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https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466250Metadata
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Glaeser, Edward Ludwig, Simon Johnson, Andrei Shleifer. "Coase versus the Coasians." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 3 (2001): 853-899. DOI: 10.1162/00335530152466250Abstract
Who should enforce laws or contracts: judges or regulators? Many Coasians, though not Coase himself, advocate judicial enforcement. We show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially shape this choice. We then compare the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s. In Poland, strict enforcement of the securities law by a highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market. In the Czech Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a moribund stock market.Other Sources
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7447Citable link to this page
https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37376588
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