Specialization, Information, and Growth: A Sequential Equilibrium Analysis
CitationNg, Yew-Kwang, and Xiaokai Yang. “Specialization, Information, and Growth: A Sequential Equilibrium Analysis.” CID Working Paper Series 1999.07, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, March 1999.
AbstractPricing costs and information problems are introduced into a framework with consumer-producers, economies of specialization, and transaction costs to predict the endogenous and concurrent evolution in division of labor and in the information of organization acquired by society. The concurrent evolution generates endogenous growth based on the tradeoff between gains from information about the efficient pattern of division of labor, which can be acquired via experiments with various patterns of division of labor, and experimentation costs, which relate to the costs in discovering prices. The concept of Walras sequential equilibrium is developed to analyze the social learning process which is featured with uncertainties of the direction of the evolution as well as a certain trend of the evolution.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:39298054