The One-Third Law of Evolutionary Dynamics

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The One-Third Law of Evolutionary Dynamics

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Title: The One-Third Law of Evolutionary Dynamics
Author: Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Bordalo, Pedro; Nowak, Martin A.

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Citation: Ohtsuki Hisashi, Pedro Bordalo, and Martin A. Nowak. 2007. The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics. Journal of Theoretical Biology 249(2): 289-295.
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Abstract: Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provide a new framework for studying selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a “one-third law” of evolutionary dynamics has been described, which states that strategy A fixates in a B-population with selective advantage if the fitness of A is greater than that of B when A has a frequency View the MathML source. This relationship holds for all evolutionary processes examined so far, from the Moran process to games on graphs. However, the origin of the “number” View the MathML source is not understood. In this paper we provide an intuitive explanation by studying the underlying stochastic processes. We find that in one invasion attempt, an individual interacts on average with B-players twice as often as with A-players, which yields the one-third law. We also show that the one-third law implies that the average Malthusian fitness of A is positive.
Published Version: doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.07.005
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4054431
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