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The Replicator Equation on Graphs
(Elsevier, 2006)
We study evolutionary games on graphs. Each player is represented
by a vertex of the graph. The edges denote who meets whom. A player can use any one of n strategies. Players obtain a payoff from interaction with all their ...
Indirect Reciprocity Provides Only a Narrow Margin of Efficiency for Costly Punishment
(Nature Publishing Group, 2009)
Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. Our behaviour towards other people depends not only on what they have done to us but also on what they have done to others. Indirect reciprocity ...
Prelife Catalysts and Replicators
(Royal Society, The, 2009)
Life is based on replication and evolution. But replication cannot be taken for granted. We must ask what there was prior to replication and evolution. How does evolution begin? We have proposed prelife as a generative ...
Originator Dynamics
(Elsevier, 2009)
We study the origin of evolution. Evolution is based on replication, mutation, and selection. But how does evolution begin? When do chemical kinetics turn into evolutionary dynamics? We propose “prelife” and “prevolution” ...
Direct Reciprocity with Costly Punishment: Generous Tit-for-Tat Prevails
(Elsevier, 2009)
The standard model for direct reciprocity is the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, where in each round players choose between cooperation and defection. Here we extend the standard framework to include costly punishment. Now ...
Direct Reciprocity on Graphs
(Elsevier, 2007)
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on the idea of repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here we examine direct reciprocity in structured populations, where individuals ...
Breaking the Symmetry Between Interaction and Replacement in Evolutionary Dynamics on Graphs
(American Physical Society, 2007)
We study the evolution of cooperation modeled as symmetric 2×2 games in a population whose structure is split into an interaction graph defining who plays with whom and a replacement graph specifying evolutionary competition. ...
Evolutionary Dynamics in Set Structured Populations
(National Academy of Sciences, 2009)
Evolutionary dynamics are strongly affected by population structure. The outcome of an evolutionary process in a well-mixed population can be very different from that in a structured population. We introduce a powerful ...
Strategy Selection in Structured Populations
(Elsevier, 2009)
Evolutionary game theory studies frequency dependent selection. The fitness of a strategy is not constant, but depends on the relative frequencies of strategies in the population. This type of evolutionary dynamics occurs ...
Evolution of Cooperation by Phenotypic Similarity
(National Academy of Sciences, 2009)
The emergence of cooperation in populations of selfish individuals is a fascinating topic that has inspired much work in theoretical biology. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation in a model where individuals are ...