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Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
(American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2007)
In human societies, cooperative behavior in joint enterprises is often enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on defectors. Many experiments on so-called public goods games have shown that in the absence of ...
Synergy and Discounting of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
(Elsevier, 2006)
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation by natural selection is an enduring conundrum in evolutionary biology, which has been studied using a variety of game theoretical models inspired by different biological situations. ...
Direct Reciprocity with Costly Punishment: Generous Tit-for-Tat Prevails
(Elsevier, 2009)
The standard model for direct reciprocity is the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, where in each round players choose between cooperation and defection. Here we extend the standard framework to include costly punishment. Now ...
Exploration Dynamics in Evolutionary Games
(National Academy of Sciences, 2009)
Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with others. We consider a system in which players unconditionally imitate more successful strategies but sometimes also explore ...
Evolutionary Dynamics in Set Structured Populations
(National Academy of Sciences, 2009)
Evolutionary dynamics are strongly affected by population structure. The outcome of an evolutionary process in a well-mixed population can be very different from that in a structured population. We introduce a powerful ...
Spatial Invasion of Cooperation
(Elsevier, 2008)
The evolutionary puzzle of cooperation describes situations where cooperators provide a fitness benefit to other individuals at some cost to themselves. Under Darwinian selection, the evolution of cooperation is a conundrum, ...
Cooperate without looking: Why we care what people think and not just what they do
(Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2015)
Evolutionary game theory typically focuses on actions but ignores motives. Here, we introduce a model that takes into account the motive behind the action. A crucial question is why do we trust people more who cooperate ...
The organization and control of an evolving interdependent population
(The Royal Society, 2015)
Starting with Darwin, biologists have asked how populations evolve from a low fitness state that is evolutionarily stable to a high fitness state that is not. Specifically of interest is the emergence of cooperation and ...